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Abstract—We design an incentive mechanism based on all-pay
auctions for participatory sensing. The organizer (principal) aims
to attract a high amount of contribution from participating users
(agents) while at the same time lowering his payout, which we for-
mulate as a proﬁt-maximization problem. We use a contribution-
dependent prize function in an environment that is speciﬁcally
tailored to participatory sensing, namely incomplete information
(with information asymmetry), risk-averse agents, and stochastic
population. We derive the optimal prize function that induces
the maximum proﬁt for the principal, while satisfying strict
individual rationality (i.e., strictly have incentive to participate at
equilibrium) for both risk-neutral and weakly risk-averse agents.
The thus induced proﬁt is demonstrated to be higher than the
maximum proﬁt induced by constant (yet optimized) prize. We
also show that our results are readily extensible to cases of risk-
neutral agents and deterministic populations.
Index Terms—Mechanism design, Bayesian game, all-pay auc-
tion, perturbation analysis, network economics, crowdsensing.
I. INTRODUCTION
The global proliferation of smartphones has spurred the
recent emergence of participatory sensing paradigm, in which
the public crowd rather than professionals undertake various
sensing activities with inbuilt sensors on their smartphones.
This paradigm relieves the need for deploying and maintaining
costly wireless sensor networks, yet can achieve pervasive
spatiotemporal coverage, making it appealing enough to have
spawned a large number of projects such as PEIR [1], ParkNet
[2] and Ear-phone [3], to name a few.
The crowdsourcing nature and lacking of intrinsic motivation
in many participatory sensing applications, however, render
incentive the foremost challenge to the viability of participatory
sensing. Although a variety of incentives in similar contexts
have been discussed, including micro-payment [4], reputation
[5], and fun [6], we deem auction [7] to be an excellent
candidate for designing incentive mechanisms, as it solves the
challenging issue of pricing participants’ effort, endogenously
(rather than by an external authority) by leveraging the market
power under a game setting. Indeed, we are not alone in holding
this opinion; some prior studies [8]–[10] were carried out in
this regard. The common central theme of these studies is to
determine a sound wage for participants using reverse auctions,
with certain objectives such as retaining auction losers [8],
minimizing cost and ensuring truthful bidding [9], [10].
In this paper, we provide a mechanism that incentivizes par-
ticipatory sensing in the spirit of all-pay auctions. In a standard
all-pay auction, the auctioneer announces an indivisible good
for sale and the bidders tender their respective bids; the highest
bid wins the good but all the bidders will have to pay their
bids. This seemingly weird form is in contrast to ﬁrst-price
or Vickery (second-price) auctions which belong to the more
intuitive category of winner-pay auctions. However, the all-pay
notion precisely reﬂects a participatory sensing campaign that
is conducted in the following form: rather than remunerating
every participant who contributes to the sensing campaign, as in
[8]–[10], the campaign organizer allocates a single prize for all
participants to compete for; the one who makes the highest
contribution will win the prize but all the participants will
have exerted (paid) their irrevocable effort (bids). Compared
to other auctions that require trusting winners to actually and
exactly pay their bids (i.e., exert their “promised” effort) after
winning the auction, all-pay auctions in the above form is
less stringent and thus may be more suitable for participatory
sensing applications which are often conducted in a largely ad-
hoc manner.
All-pay auctions are not limited to modeling participatory
sensing but can be applied to crowdsourcing and contests
[11]–[14] as well. There is also a wealth of literature in
auction theory [7], [15]. Our work differs from prior work in a
number of important aspects enumerated below, which as well
constitute our main contributions.
Proﬁt maximization: Generally speaking, proﬁt involves
both revenue and cost. In standard auctions (including ﬁrst-
price, second-price, and all-pay versions) [7], [15] and many
of their variants (including contests and crowdsourcing) [11]–
[14], the auctioned item or the prize is ﬁxed ex-ante and hence
the cost to the auctioneer is constant. This is also the case in [9]
when describing its platform-centric model; although its user-
centric model has a variable cost component (as an immediate
result of paying different sets of users) in the organizer’s
utility, the maximum organizer utility cannot be achieved due
to NP-hardness. The work [10] minimizes the total payment
to participants (i.e., cost), but does not factor revenue into
the objective function; instead, a ﬁxed revenue (in the form
of the quality of service) was taken as a constraint to satisfy.
Moreover, the all-pay auction approach that we take also sets
our work apart from [8]–[10].
In this paper, we allow the organizer (henceforth referred
to as the principal1) to set the prize as a function of the
1We adopt the terminology of “principal” and “agent” due to the analogy
of participatory sensing to the principal-agent problem which concerns the
difﬁculties in motivating the agents to act in the best interest of the principal
while the two parties have different interests and asymmetric information.978-1-4799-3360-0/14/$31.00 c© 2014 IEEE
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winner’s contribution in order to induce the maximum proﬁt
which is deﬁned as the total contribution acquired from all the
users (henceforth referred to as agents) less the contribution-
dependent prize. We demonstrate that such a contribution-
dependent prize can induce higher proﬁt than optimal constant-
prize mechanisms.
Risk-averse agents: One most common (and often implicit)
assumption in the related literature is that agents are risk
neutral. Loosely speaking, it means that agents are indifferent
between a sure-win $50 reward and a $100 reward that is
conditioned on ﬂipping a coin. This is not always true in real
scenarios, particularly when agents are risk averse, preferring
the guaranteed $50 reward in the above example. Therefore,
we pose the problem by facing the principal with risk-averse
agents who have stronger reluctance to lose than willingness
to win the same amount. Not only does this set up a more
realistic problem, but it also lends generality to our solution
which subsumes risk-neutral agents as well.
On the other hand, this brings about the challenge that the
celebrated revenue equivalence theorem2 [16], [17], which is
a powerful facility to analyzing many auctions, breaks in our
model. Another challenge is that there is generally no explicit
solution to risk aversion models. To overcome these difﬁculties,
we use perturbation analysis introduced by [18].
Stochastic population: Another common and implicit as-
sumption in standard auctions and the majority of related work,
is that the number of agents is common knowledge ex ante.
This does not apply to many participatory sensing scenarios
where agents barely know how many other agents are actively
participating; even the principal, who may be able to retrieve
(e.g., from database) the number of agents who have registered
for the sensing campaign, is still unable to know the number
of actual participating agents—indeed, the discrepancy between
the two numbers can be substantial.
In view of this realistic constraint, we assume a stochastic
setting where the number of agents is uncertain. It is note-
worthy that allowing for uncertainty bestows us an additional
advantage: a participatory sensing campaign thus modeled can
accommodate ad hoc entry. That is, agents can enter the auction
anytime, instead of being required to place bids simultaneously
as in other auctions. This has practical implication as the public
crowds, who are participatory sensing users, behave by and
large in an ad-hoc manner.
Incomplete information with information asymmetry: As
participatory sensing involves a potentially large population of
agents who typically are strangers to one another, we consider
an incomplete information setting with information asymmetry:
agents are at the interim stage where each of them knows
exactly his own type3 but only probabilistically about other
agents’ types, while the principal is at the ex ante stage where
he does not know each agent’s exact type but only has the same
probabilistic knowledge as the agents have. This Bayesian game
setting is in contrast to the complete-information game setting
2The theorem states that any auction will lead to the same expected revenue
if the auction satisﬁes a set of standard assumptions.
3As a standard term in Bayesian games and mechanism design, “type” refers
to a player’s private information or signal, such as his valuation of the auctioned
item, his skill level, marginal cost, etc.
which is used by [9] (particularly the platform-centric model)
and [19] for example.
Altogether, our proﬁt-maximization objective along with the
main assumptions enumerated above, which are speciﬁcally
tailored to the context of participatory sensing, constitute a
unique (and presumably meaningful) problem to tackle, and
underpin the main contributions of this work.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper also represents
the ﬁrst work that explicitly introduces all-pay auctions into
participatory sensing for incentive mechanism design.
Finally, besides maximizing proﬁt for the principal, our
mechanism satisﬁes strict individual rationality for both risk-
neutral and weakly risk-averse agents. That is, such agents
expect strictly positive payoff at equilibria; or in other words,
they strictly have incentive to participate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
reviews the literature and Section III describes our model. In
Section IV, we solve for the optimal prize function that induces
the maximum proﬁt, and prove the strict individual rationality.
Section V provides a case study in order to derive an intuitive
understanding of our analysis and to demonstrate key properties
of our results. Section VI concludes.
II. RELATED WORK
Arguably the ﬁrst study that addresses incentive for partici-
patory sensing using (reverse) auctions is [8], in which mobile
users sell their sensing data to the organizer by bidding their
desired selling prices. Those who bid lower than a (hidden)
threshold—set by the organizer—will win and can sell at their
respective bid prices, while the rest will lose and not get paid.
A main feature thereof was to “subsidize” losers with virtual
credits to reduce their in-effect bid prices but not affect their
actual pay if they win. This helps retain users and keep the
winning price competitive (i.e., sufﬁciently low).
Two other incentive models were investigated by [9]. One
is called a platform-centric model, in which a central platform
allocates a constant reward to be divided among all the users
in proportion to their respectively planned sensing times. The
constant reward is optimized in terms of maximizing the
platform utility, by formulating a Stackelberg game under
a complete-information setting where users’ unit costs are
common knowledge. The other model is called a user-centric
model, in which each user claims a task set to undertake
together with his desired payment, and the platform selects a
subset of users (as winners) to perform the tasks and pays them
no lower than their respective bids. This is essentially a reverse
auction. However, maximizing the platform utility turns out to
be NP-hard, and as such the design objective was to ensure
each user to report his true cost for payment.
Likewise, [10] also lets users report their unit costs, but the
service provider will decide on each users’ participation level
(e.g., data sampling rate) as well as his payment. A reverse
auction mechanism is proposed to minimize the total payment
while satisfying a given quality of service. It also achieves
incentive compatibility as in [9], i.e., users declare their types
(unit costs) truthfully.
Our model allows each agent to (strategically) decide on his
own participation level, which we deem to be more natural. Our
all-pay auction mechanism satisﬁes strict individual rationality,
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while incentive compatibility is technically unrelated because
in our case the agent type (cost, skill, etc.) is endogenized into
his bidding strategy (participation level).
A crowdsourcing website offering diverse online tasks for
users to undertake and earn reward was studied by [13] as a
matching market, where users select tasks based on their skill
sets and the offered (constant) prizes. The problem is tackled
using the revenue equivalence theorem by virtue of adopting
standard assumptions such as risk neutrality. In addition, the
number of users is assumed to be known. These assumptions
are also adopted by [9], [10].
Along a different spirit, [20] proposes a market-based in-
centive scheme using a demand-and-supply model: participants
are not only data suppliers but also service consumers who
demand information service provisioned from processing the
contributed data. Therefore, instead of offering monetary in-
centive, the service provider allocates consumable service to
participants in accordance with their data contribution levels, in
such a way that ensures fairness and maximizes social welfare.
In the vast economic literature, all-pay auctions with com-
plete information was analyzed by Baye et al. [19], where every
bidder’s valuation of the item on sale is common knowledge.
In contrast, [12], [14] study all-pay auctions with incomplete
information, but focus on investigating whether a single prize or
multiple prizes (with the same lump sum) should be allocated
in order to maximize the quality of the highest k submissions
[12] or the aggregate quality [14]. Along a similar line, [11]
shows that in a standard all-pay auction, the highest bid is at
least half the sum of all the bids.
With a known number of risk-neutral players, [21], [22]
examine a paradoxical behavior where a reduction in the reward
or an increase in cost may actually increase the expected sum
of bids or the highest bid. On the other hand, yet still with a
deterministic population, [23] studies risk-averse players with
a ﬁxed item on sale in ﬁrst-price auctions.
For ﬁrst and second-price auctions, [24] assumes that the
the number of bidders is known to the auctioneer and studies
the difference in revenue between concealing and revealing this
number to bidders. That study does not characterize equilibrium
bidding strategies (whereas this study does). A similar problem
was studied by [25] but using a different approach called a
maxmin expected utility model. Equilibrium bidding strategies
for standard winner-pay (instead of all-pay) auctions are charac-
terized by [26] and [7] using different methods, e.g., the revenue
equivalence theorem [7] which is not applicable to our model.
Recently, [27] studied all-pay auctions with a random number
of identical bidders whose types are equal, whereas we consider
agents of heterogeneous types which reﬂect the diversity of
participants more realistically in the context of participatory
sensing.
III. MODEL
We consider a general class of participatory sensing appli-
cations in which a principal announces some sensing activity
and calls for participation to a potentially large population of
agents. As participating in the activity (e.g., sending sensory
information from smartphones) will incur cost (e.g., battery
drain, network charge, time and effort commitment) to agents,
the principal announces a monetary prize as the incentive, to be
rewarded to the agent who makes the highest contribution by
the end of the activity, or by the end of a prescribed period if the
activity is conducted periodically. Agents have the ﬂexibility to
start contributing anytime (i.e., ad hoc entry) after the call for
participation is announced by the principal.
Principal
Agents contribution
zitype si
cost si h(zi)
winner's prize
M(z(1)) Profit
(n)
Figure 1: An all-pay auction based model for participatory sensing.
An agent i is characterized by a unique type si ∈ [s, s¯]
which is private information; the type could be the marginal
cost of participation, as used by [9], [10], or a (monotone
decreasing) function of agent’s skill, as used by [13]. There
is a continuum of agent types independently drawn from
[s, s¯] according to an atomless, right-continuous cumulative
distribution function F (s), which is common knowledge.4 Each
agent decides on the amount of contribution zi to make, which
is his strategy. The amount zi could be a simple measure of
quantity alone (e.g. sensing time [9]) or a compound measure of
both quality and quantity (e.g., cumulative information quality
[28]).5 Making the contribution zi will incur a cost sih(zi)
to agent i. Unlike the conventional linear cost model used in
the vast literature, we allow for more generality by inserting
a modulator function h(·) to model the (possibly nonlinear)
impact of an agent’s contribution strategy on his cumulative
cost—for instance, an analogy could be drawn to the Matthew
effect (the rich get richer and the poor get poorer). We assume
that h(·) is continuous, h(0) = 0 and h′ > 0. Key notations
are summarized in Fig. 1.
The principal is pre-committed to reward a monetary prize
to the agent who makes the highest contribution. The prize is
not ﬁxed but is a continuous function M(·) of the maximum
of n˜ agents’ contributions, z(n˜)(1) , following the notation in order
statistics. The rationale is to examine if we can induce a higher
proﬁt which is deﬁned as the total contribution acquired from all
the agents less the contribution-dependent prize (i.e., revenue
less cost), or formally,
Ω(n˜, z) =
n˜∑
i=1
zi −M(z(n˜)(1) ). (1)
where n˜ is the (uncertain) number of agents.
Agents are risk averse, characterized by a von Neumann-
Morgenstern (vNM) utility function u(·) that is twice differ-
entiable and satisﬁes u(0) = 0, u′ > 0, u′′ < 0 (i.e., more
4In participatory sensing, such an independent-private-value model [7] with
Bayesian belief can be realized using historical information or, in the absence,
by adopting the uniform distribution, as similarly discussed in [10].
5In practice, zi can be measured by agents’ smartphones or by the principal,
depending on the application. In the latter case, the value is fed back to the
corresponding agent (e.g., on his phone) continually to keep him informed and
for him to decide when to stop contributing.
IEEE INFOCOM 2014 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications
129
reluctant to lose than willing to gain), and accordingly an agent
i’s payoff function is formulated as
πi(si, z) =
{
u(M(zi)− sih(zi)), if zi > zj , ∀j = i;
u(−sih(zi)), otherwise.
(2)
Note that our model subsumes risk-neutral agents by simply
letting u(x) = x. We ignore the situation of multiple winners,
which happens with zero probability since F is atomless and z
is a monotone function of s [7]. The number of agents n˜ follows
a probability mass function pn := Pr(n˜ = n), n = 0, 1, 2...,
which is common knowledge.
Problem statement: Our objective is to design an incentive
mechanism based on the above all-pay auction such that (a) the
expected proﬁt of the principal at equilibrium is maximized,
i.e., maxM(·) Ω∗ where Ω∗ := En˜[Ω(n˜, z∗)] and “*” signiﬁes
equilibrium, and (b) strict individual rationality is satisﬁed, i.e.,
π∗i := πi(si, z
∗) > 0 iff z∗i (si) > 0, for both risk-neutral
and weakly risk-averse agents.6 In other words, the expected
payoff of each such agent is strictly positive if he contributes.
Compared to the canonical deﬁnition of individual rationality
which only requires non-negativity (π∗i ≥ 0), our mechanism
implies a stronger motivation to participants.
IV. ANALYSIS
We ﬁrst analyze the equilibrium contribution strategy z∗
for a stochastic population of (weakly or strongly) risk-averse
agents, and then solve for the optimal prize function M(·) that
maximizes the principal’s expected proﬁt Ω∗ facing weakly
risk-averse agents. The results are then extended to risk-neutral
agents and deterministic populations.
A. Equilibrium contribution strategy
Deﬁnition 1 (Bayesian Nash Equilibrium). A (pure strategy)
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of our all-pay auction model is a
strategy proﬁle z∗ := (z∗1 , z
∗
2 , ...) that satisﬁes
πi(z
∗
i (si), z
∗
−i(s−i)) ≥ πi(zi, z∗−i(s−i)), ∀zi, ∀i.
In words, at a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, each agent plays
a (pure) strategy that maximizes his expected payoff given his
belief about other agents’ types and that other agents play their
respective equilibrium strategies.
Lemma 1. There exists a pure strategy Bayesian Nash equi-
librium for the all-pay auction deﬁned in Section III.
Proof: Our auction model corresponds to a Bayesian
game setting where a higher type induces a lower bid. Hence
whenever every agent other than an arbitrary agent i uses a de-
creasing strategy, i.e., each zj ∈ z−i is a monotone decreasing
function of type sj , agent i’s best response zi is also decreasing
in si [14]. This satisﬁes the Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing
property [29] and thus a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE)
exists in every ﬁnite-action Bayesian game. Further, given that
the functions M(·), h(·), u(·) are all continuous and there is
a continuum of agent type s, the game induced from our all-
pay auction model has continuous payoffs and a continuum of
strategies. Therefore, according to [29], there exists a sequence
6In this paper, individual rationality (IR) refers to interim IR.
of PSNE in ﬁnite-action games that converges to a PSNE of
the continuum-action game.
In the sequel, we simply say “equilibrium” to refer to
pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Also, we focus on
symmetric equilibrium in which all agents adopt the same
strategy function at equilibrium.7
Analyzing the equilibrium strategy involves expressing an
agent’s expected payoff using the probability that he wins
the auction. Related to this probability and in a stochastic
population setting, contingent bidding8 was proposed by [26]
but is not applicable to participatory sensing, because the
principal does not know the number of contributing agents
before they actually contribute, let alone that agents cannot
make contingent effort as effort is irrevocable. In our case—a
Bayesian auction in which a higher type induces a lower bid,
an agent’s strategy zi is a monotone decreasing function of si,
and determines the probability that he wins the auction when
there are n˜ = n agents to be Pr(zi > zj , ∀j = i|n˜ = n) =
(1 − F (si))n−1. Therefore, under a stochastic population, the
winning probability for an arbitrary agent of type s is
P (s) =
∑
n
pn(1− F (s))n−1. (3)
However, one should not be alluded to reckoning that, once
agent i’s equilibrium strategy when ﬁxing n˜ = n can be
obtained, say as z∗i (n), his strategy in the stochastic case is
immediately given by z∗i =
∑
n pnz
∗
i (n). The reason is that,
simplistically speaking, z∗i is not an afﬁne optimizer (in the
sense of best-response strategy) of π∗i , as analogous to Jensen’s
inequality. Indeed, even in a standard auction where bidders
are risk-neutral, the equilibrium bidding strategy with uncertain
population is not simply a pn-weighted sum, as shown by [7].
Note that, however, the proof technique used by [7] does not
apply here because it uses the revenue equivalence theorem
which assumes risk neutrality.
Now we write an agent’s expected payoff, using (2), as
π(s, z) = u(M(z)− h(z)s)P (s) + u(−h(z)s)(1− P (s))
= P (s)
[
u(α)− u(−β)]+ u(−β) (4)
where we denote α := M(z)− h(z)s and β := h(z)s.
Lemma 2. In an all-pay auction with incomplete information
and a stochastic population of risk-averse agents, given a
contribution-dependent prize function M(z), the equilibrium
strategy z∗(s) is determined by∫ s¯
s
[
P (s1)
(
u′(α∗)− u′(−β∗)
)
+ u′(−β∗)
]
h(z∗(s1)) ds1
= P (s)
[
u(α∗)− u(−β∗)]+ u(−β∗) (5)
where α∗ = M(z∗)− h(z∗)s and β∗ = h(z∗)s.
Proof: Because each agent is playing his best response
at equilibrium, his payoff π∗ is also the solution to the
optimization problem maxz π(s, z∗). Furthermore, we know
7In Bayesian games, a strategy is a function mapping from type space to
action/strategy space.
8In contingent bidding, each bidder submits a list of bids like “I bid
z1 if there are n1 bidders, z2 if n2, ...” After collecting all the lists, the
auctioneer knows the actual number of bidders and will use the contingent
bids corresponding to that number (nk).
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π∗ = π(s, z∗(s)) if the equilibrium strategy z∗(s) is given.
Therefore, we use the envelope theorem [30] to obtain
∂π∗
∂s
= −P (s)[u′(α∗)h(z∗)−u′(−β∗)h(z∗)]−u′(−β∗)h(z∗).
Since the highest-type agent never wins the auction at equi-
librium, he will contribute zero and reap zero surplus, i.e.,
z∗(s¯) = 0 and π∗(s¯) = 0. Therefore, integrating both sides
from s to s¯ leads to the l.h.s. being
∫ s¯
s
∂π∗
∂s = −π∗(s). The
result is then proven by plugging in (4).
In general, there is no explicit expression of equilibrium
strategy when agents are risk-averse or the prize is not constant;
otherwise, Lemma 2 yields a closed-form solution, demon-
strated later by Corollary 3.9
B. Proﬁt maximization
When every agent adopts equilibrium strategy z∗(·), it fol-
lows from (1) that
Ω(n˜, z∗) = n˜
∫ s¯
s
z∗ dF −M(z∗(n˜)(1) )
where n˜ is temporarily treated as given. Because z∗(n˜)(1) =
z∗(s(n˜)(n˜)) where s
(n˜)
(n˜) is the n˜-th order of all agent types (i.e.,
the minimum of all the n˜ types), and from order statistics we
know that the c.d.f. of s(n˜)(n˜) is 1− (1− F (s))n˜, hence
M
(
z∗(n˜)(1)
)
=
∫ s¯
s
M(z∗(s)) d[1− (1− F (s))n˜].
Therefore, the expected proﬁt at equilibrium is given by
Ω∗ = En˜[Ω(n˜, z∗)]
=
∑
n
npn
∫ s¯
s
[z∗ −M(z∗)(1− F )n−1] dF. (6)
To maximize this proﬁt, we need to derive an explicit
expression of M(z∗) from (5), which unfortunately cannot
be obtained as aforementioned. To deal with this challenge,
we consider the case of weak risk aversion10 and employ
perturbation analysis introduced by [18] to solve the problem.
For weakly risk-averse agents, the vNM utility function can
be written as
u(x) = x+ u1(x) +O(
2), 0 <   1.
where  is the risk aversion parameter and 0 <   1 means
weak risk aversion. The function u1 satisﬁes u1(0) = 0, u′′1 <
0, and u′1 > − 1 , so that u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0.
Then, using perturbation analysis, we can rewrite
u(α) = α+ u1(α) +O(
2)
= α+ u1(αrn) +O(
2),
u(−β) = −β + u1(−β) +O(2)
= −β + u1(−βrn) +O(2),
u′(α) = 1 + u′1(αrn) +O(
2),
u′(−β) = 1 + u′1(−βrn) +O(2),
(7)
9Closed-form solutions are also obtained in Theorem 1 and Corollary 2; note,
however, that they pertain to the optimal equilibrium and not all equilibria.
10Weak risk aversion is in fact a common phenomenon in practice. As an
intuitive example, although one would prefer a guaranteed $49 over half-likely
$100, he would not prefer a guaranteed $20 over half-likely $100.
where the subscript rn signiﬁes the risk-neutral case, i.e.,
αrn = Mrn(zrn)− h(zrn)s, βrn = h(zrn)s.
Notation: We have mentioned that we use superscript star (*)
to indicate equilibrium (induced by any given prize function). In
the sequel, we use overhead circle (◦) to indicate the optimal
equilibrium (induced by the optimal, i.e., proﬁt-maximizing,
prize function).
Theorem 1. In an all-pay auction with incomplete information
and a stochastic population of weakly risk-averse agents, the
optimal prize function that induces the maximum proﬁt for the
principal is given by
M˚(z) =
1
P (˚s(z))
[˚
s(z)h(z)− A˚(˚s(z))+∫ z
0
B˚(˚s(z1))h(z1) d˚s(z1)
]
. (8)
In the above, s˚(z) is the inverse function of z˚(s) which is the
optimal equilibrium strategy, induced by (8) as
z˚(s) = g−1
( aF ′(s)
G′(s)s+G(s)B˚(s)
)
, (9)
where g(·) := h′(·), h′′ > 0, a =∑n npn,
G(s) =
∫ s
s
F ′(s1)
∑
n npn(1− F (s1))n−1∑
n pn(1− F (s1))n−1
ds1,
A˚(s) = P (s)[u1(α˚rn)− u1(−β˚rn)] + u1(−β˚rn),
B˚(s) = P (s)[u′1(α˚rn)− u′1(−β˚rn)] + 1 + u′1(−β˚rn).
(10)
Proof: Rewrite (5) using perturbation expressions (7), as∫ s¯
s
[
P (s1)
(
u′1(α
∗
rn)− u′1(−β∗rn)
)
+ 1 + u′1(−β∗rn)
]
× h(z∗) ds1
= P (s)M(z∗) + P (s)[u1(α∗rn)− u1(−β∗rn)]− β∗
+ u1(−β∗rn), or∫ s¯
s
B∗(s1)h(z∗) ds1 = P (s)M(z∗) +A∗(s)− β∗ (11)
where
A∗(s) = P (s)[u1(α∗rn)− u1(−β∗rn)] + u1(−β∗rn),
B∗(s) = P (s)[u′1(α
∗
rn)− u′1(−β∗rn)] + 1 + u′1(−β∗rn)
(12)
are functions of s only, given z∗rn and Mrn(·). Hence,
M(z∗) =
1
P (s)
(
β∗ −A∗(s) +
∫ s¯
s
B∗(s1)h(z∗) ds1
)
. (13)
Substituting (13) into (6) yields
Ω∗ =
∫ s¯
s
[
z∗
∑
n
npn −
∑
n npn(1− F )n−1∑
n pn(1− F )n−1
×
(
β∗ −A∗(s) +
∫ s¯
s
B∗(s1)h(z∗) ds1
)]
dF
=
∫ s¯
s
[
az∗F ′ −G′(s)(β∗ −A∗(s))
]
ds−
∫ s¯
s
[
G′(s)
∫ s¯
s
B∗(s1)h(z∗) ds1
]
ds,
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where we note that z∗ is no longer a function of n as in the
usual deterministic population setting. Integrating the second
term by parts gives(
G(s)
∫ s¯
s
B∗(s1)h(z∗) ds1
)∣∣∣s¯
s
−
∫ s¯
s
G(s)(−B∗(s)h(z∗)) ds
=
∫ s¯
s
G(s)B∗(s)h(z∗) ds.
Thus, the principal’s objective can be rewritten as
max
z∗
Ω∗ =
∫ s¯
s
[
az∗F ′ −G′(s)(β∗ −A∗(s))
−G(s)B∗(s)h(z∗)
]
ds. (14)
Here we have changed from optimizing over M(z) to over
z∗, because the principal essentially aims to induce an optimal
equilibrium strategy (by the means of an optimal prize func-
tion) that maximizes his proﬁt. Solving (14) is equivalent to
maximizing the integrand which we denote by γ. Using the
ﬁrst-order condition (FOC) with respect to z∗ and ﬁxing s, we
have
∂γ
∂z∗
= aF ′ − sG′(s)h′(z∗)−G(s)B∗(s)h′(z∗) = 0, (15)
from which the optimum solution (9) follows (with z∗ changed
to z˚ and B∗ to B˚). Then, (8) is obtained by substituting s˚(z)
for s in (13) (with A∗ changed to A˚) and converting the limits
of integral.
In addition, for the FOC to lead to a valid maximizer, we
require ∂
2γ
∂z∗2 < 0 which implies [G
′(s)s+G(s)B∗(s)]h′′(z∗) >
0. Under weak risk aversion,   1, so B∗(s) > 0. Further-
more, because G′(s) > 0 and G(s) > 0, it requires h′′ > 0.
Since A˚(s) and B˚(s) as deﬁned in (10) assume M˚rn(·)
and z˚rn, which are the optimal prize function and the induced
optimal equilibrium strategy in the corresponding risk-neutral
case, we solve for these two in Corollary 2.
Recalling our problem statement in Section III which in-
volves both proﬁt maximization and strict individual rationality,
we state the following result.
Theorem 2. The equilibrium strategy (as given by Lemma 2)
satisﬁes strict individual rationality for both risk-neutral and
weakly risk-averse agents.
Proof: From the proof of Lemma 2 we know that π∗(s)
equals the l.h.s. of (5), which is rewritten in the proof of
Theorem 1 as the l.h.s. of (11). Hence,
π∗(s) =
∫ s¯
s
B∗(s1)h(z∗(s1)) ds1.
Rearrange B∗(s), as deﬁned in (12), as
B∗(s) = [P (s)u′1(α
∗
rn) + (1− P (s))u′1(−β∗rn)] + 1.
For risk-neutral agents, B∗(s) = 1 because  = 0. For weakly
risk-averse agents, u′1 > − 1 and hence
B∗(s) > [−P (s)

− 1− P (s)

] + 1 = 0.
Since h(z) > 0 iff z > 0, therefore for both agents it holds
that π∗ > 0 iff z∗ > 0, i.e., an agent who makes nonzero
contribution11 expects strictly positive payoff at equilibrium.
C. Risk-neutral agents
The results for risk-neutral agents can be derived conve-
niently from the general results presented in the preceding
section.
Corollary 1. In an all-pay auction with incomplete information
and a stochastic population of risk-neutral agents, given a
contribution-dependent prize function Mrn(z), the equilibrium
strategy z∗rn(s) is determined by∫ s¯
s
h(z∗rn(t)) dt = Mrn(z
∗
rn)P (s)− h(z∗rn)s. (16)
Proof: Immediately follows from Lemma 2 by substituting
u(x) = x and u′ = 1 into (5).
Corollary 2. In an all-pay auction with incomplete information
and a stochastic population of risk-neutral agents, the optimal
prize function that induces the maximum proﬁt for the principal
is given by
M˚rn(z) =
1
P (˚srn(z))
[˚
srn(z)h(z) +
∫ z
0
h(z1) d˚srn(z1)
]
(17)
where s˚rn(z) is the inverse function of z˚rn(s) which is the
optimal equilibrium strategy, induced by (17) as
z˚rn(s) = g
−1
( aF ′(s)
G′(s)s+G(s)
)
(18)
where g(·) := h′(·), h′′ > 0.
Proof: Letting  = 0 leads to A˚(s) = 0 and B˚(s) = 1.
Substituting these into Theorem 1 yields the result.
D. Deterministic population
When the number of agents is known ex ante, we present
the results with respect to risk-averse and risk-neutral agents
separately, as one particular set of the results will be used later.
Risk averse, deterministic population (RA-DP): In this
case, we have expressions simpliﬁed to a = n,G′(s) =
nF ′(s), G(s) = nF (s), P (s) = (1 − F (s))n−1. Substituting
these into Lemma 2 and Theorem 1, we obtain the optimal
equilibrium strategy and optimal prize function for the RA-DP
case. We omit full details for brevity.
Risk neutral, deterministic population (RN-DP): Substi-
tuting the same set of simpliﬁed expressions as above, and
additionally u(x) = x and  = 0, into Corollary 1 and
Corollary 2, yields the result for RN-DP (this result is spelt out
below as it will be referred to by our case study in Section V):
the optimal prize function is given by
M˚rn,dp(zrn,dp) =
s˚(zrn,dp)h(zrn,dp) +
∫ zrn,dp
0
h(z1) d˚s(z1)
(1− F (˚s(zrn,dp))n−1 ,
(19)
11The highest-type agent will not participate for otherwise he will expect
negative utility if he contributes any z > 0. In fact, this agent arises with zero
probability because F (s) is atomless.
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which induces the optimal equilibrium strategy
z˚rn,dp(s) = g
−1
( F ′
sF ′ + F
)
. (20)
Finally and in particular, if the prize is constant, we have an
explicit and compact result on the equilibrium strategy:
Corollary 3. In an all-pay auction with incomplete information
and a deterministic population n of risk-neutral agents, given
a constant prize M0, the equilibrium strategy is given by
z∗rn,dp,cp = h
−1
(
(n− 1)M0
∫ s¯
s
(1− F )n−2F
′(t)
t
dt
)
(21)
Proof: Substituting M0 into (16) for Mrn(·) and differen-
tiating (16) with respect to s yields
−h(z∗rn,dp,cp) = M0P ′(s)− h(z∗rn,dp,cp)− s
dh(z∗rn,dp,cp)
ds
⇒ z∗rn,dp,cp = h−1
(
−M0
∫ s¯
s
P ′(t)
t
dt
)
,
plugging P (s) = (1− F )n−1 into which leads to (21).
In this (simplest) case, (1) simpliﬁes to
Ω∗rn,dp,cp = n
∫ s¯
s
z∗rn,dp,cp dF −M0, (22)
and hence the principal can maximize his proﬁt by optimizing
over M0 using the ﬁrst-order condition, given the distribution
function F (·) and modulator function h(·). This is demon-
strated in Section V.
Remark: Interestingly, it might be counter-intuitive to note
that agents’ contribution strategy z˚rn,dp given by (20) is in-
dependent of population size n, whereas the strategy under a
constant prize, as in (21) and all the standard auctions, depends
on n. The latter is quite easily understood by intuition: a larger
number of agents imply a more competitive auction and hence
an agent should adjust his strategy accordingly. So, why agents
become indifferent to this number now?
The reason, which is equally interesting, is as follows. In
standard all-pay auctions, increasing population size n causes
a dampening effect where agents shade their bids downward
to minimize loss because the auction becomes harder to win.
However, now that the principal has the privilege to functionize
the prize, he could do better by endogenizing the number n
into the prize function (see (19)) in such a way that each agent
would maintain his bid (contribution).
Of course, the prize should not be raised insofar as to incur
deﬁcit; indeed, the principal reaps a larger proﬁt than using a
(optimal) constant prize, which we show in Section V.
V. CASE STUDY
We consider a participatory sensing campaign in which
a government ofﬁce (the principal) wants to acquire certain
information such as real-time noise or trafﬁc data from smart-
phone users (agents) citywide continuously. Each agent is
characterized by his type—his marginal cost of contributing the
data—derived from (as the inverse of) his skill or competency.
We assume that agents’ competency levels are independently
and uniformly drawn from a continuous interval (0, 1], and
hence the agent type s is independently distributed as per
c.d.f. F (s) = 1 − 1s , s ∈ [1,∞). An agent i who makes
a cumulative contribution of zi will incur a cost of sih(zi),
where the modulator function h(z) = zw, w > 1, describes
a superlinear increase of cumulative cost when contribution
accrues. This corresponds to, for instance, the following sce-
narios: (1) h(z) is the time or effort needed to produce a
certain value of information (VoI) z (e.g., in terms of entropy)
that exhibits diminishing gain from time/effort, and hence to
produce more VoI consumes increasingly more time/effort; (2)
the contribution z relates linearly to an agent’s time/effort but
making contribution interferes more and more with the agent’s
regular life and work activities as z increases, or he becomes
increasingly more impatient as time/effort is continually spent
on the sensing activity. In the sequel, we take the quadratic
function (i.e, w = 2) for numeric calculation.
Agents are weakly risk averse, characterized by a vNM
function u(x) = x − x2. The number of contributing agents
is uncertain, but is known to follow a uniform probability
mass function pn = 1N , n = 2, 3, ..., N+1. The maximum,
N+1, could be the total number of registered smartphone users,
retrieved from a registrant database.
In the following, we compare the maximum proﬁt induced
by our mechanism (contribution-dependent prize, or CDP)
with that induced by the optimal constant-prize mechanism
(OCP), under two settings, RA-SP and RN-DP (spelt out in
the headings below). There are obviously two other possible
combinations, but we choose to demonstrate using these two
“extremes” in the sense of complexity.
A. Risk averse, stochastic population (RA-SP)
To apply Theorem 1, ﬁrst we calculate G′(s) =
1
s2 [
∑N+1
n=2 n(
1
s )
n−1]/[
∑N+1
n=2 (
1
s )
n−1]. By denoting t := 1s ∈
(0, 1] and noting that
∑
n nt
n−1 = (
∑
n t
n)′t,
G′(s(t)) = t2
[ t
2(1−tN )
1−t ]
′
t
t(1−tN )
1−t
= t2 ·
t2−2t+(N+2)tN+1−(N+1)tN+2
(1−t)2
t(1−tN )
1−t
= t2
[ (N+1)tN1
1−tN1
− 1
1−tN1
− 11−t1
]
,
∴ G(s(t)) =
∫ s
1
G′(s1) ds1 =
∫ 1
t
G′(s(t1)) 1t21 dt1
=
∫ 1
t
[ (N+1)tN1
1−tN1
− 1
1−tN1
− 11−t1
]
dt1.
Since a = N+32 , it follows from Corollary 2 that
z˚rn(s) = (N + 3)/[4G
′(s)s3 + 4G(s)s2],
M˚rn(s) = [h(˚zrn)s− π˚rn(s)]/P (s)
where we denote π˚rn(s) := −
∫ z˚rn
0
h(z1) d˚srn(z1). Because
u1(x) = −x2, we can spell out
A˚(s) = P (s)[2M˚rn(s)h(˚zrn)s− M˚2rn(s)]− h2(˚zrn)s2
= −[ 1P π˚2rn + 2( 1P − 1)˚πrnh(˚zrn)s+ ( 1P − 1)h2(˚zrn)s2],
B˚(s) = −2P (s)M˚rn(s) + 1 + 2h(˚zrn)s
= (2− 2)h(˚zrn)s+ 2˚πrn + 1.
Now we can apply Theorem 1 to obtain the optimal equilibrium
strategy as
z˚(s) =
(N + 3)/4
G′(s)s3 +G(s)s2[(2− 2)h(˚zrn)s+ 2˚πrn + 1]
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and the maximum proﬁt (following from (14) as a shortcut)
Ω˚ =
∫ ∞
1
[ (N+3)z˚
2s2 −G′(s)
(
h(˚z)s− A˚(s))−G(s)B˚(s)h(˚z)] ds
where P = s+12s2 and h(x) = x
2.
We compute the above expressions using numerical methods
and symbolic computation tools with Mathematica.12
Constant Prize: When the prize is a constant M0, we solve
for equilibrium strategy z∗ by substituting M0 into (11) for
M(z∗) and differentiating (11) with respect to s, yielding
dh(z∗cp)
ds
+ (1−B∗(s))h(z∗cp) = M0P ′(s) +A∗′(s).
Note that A∗(s) and B∗(s) in the above assume z∗rn,cp, which
is given by
z∗rn,cp = −
M0
2
∫ ∞
s
P ′(s1)
s1
ds1 = (
1
8s2
+
1
6s3
)M0,
obtained by following the proof of Corollary 3.
To maximize the proﬁt, we ﬁrst solve for z∗cp by symbolically
solving the above differential equation together with h(x) = x2.
Then, substituting z∗cp into Ω
∗
cp =
∑
npn
∫ s¯
s
z∗cp dF −M0, we
numerically compute the maximum.13
Results: Fig. 2 compares the proﬁt induced by CDP (our
mechanism) to that by OCP. In Fig. 2a, we ﬁx risk aversion
parameter  = 0.1 and vary N = 2, 3, ..., 6 (recall that
n = 2, 3, ..., N+1). The graph indicates that CDP constantly
outperforms OCP for all N . Due to the toolkit limit on
computation, we choose to demonstrate a larger range of n
in the deterministic case (next subsection) where we discuss
results in greater detail.
In Fig. 2b, we ﬁxN = 5 and vary  from 0.05 to 0.3 with step
size 0.05.14 We ﬁnd that risk aversion affects proﬁt positively
in both mechanisms: both CDP and OCP gain slightly higher
proﬁt (by about 8-15%) than with risk-neutral agents. This is
because risk-averse agents bid more aggressively for fear of
losing the auction. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that risk aversion has
a bigger positive impact on the proﬁt of CDP than of OCP,
and the proﬁt of CDP exhibits convexity as  gets larger. This
is manifested by the two tangent lines drawn at  = 0.05 and
 = 0.3; on the other hand, OCP exhibits an approximately
linear relation to risk aversion.
B. Risk neutral, deterministic population (RN-DP)
The equilibrium strategy in this case follows from (20) to
be z˚ = 12s2 , and accordingly s˚ =
1√
2z
. The optimal prize
function then follows from (19) to be M˚(z) = (2z)2−
n
2 /6
or equivalently, in terms of s, M˚(s) = sn−4/6.
The resultant maximum proﬁt is obtained from (6) (with
slight adaptation to DP) as
Ω˚ = n
∫ ∞
1
[˚z(s)− M˚(z)(1− F )n−1] dF = 1
8
n.
12Relevant tools include Integrate, NIntegrate, and InverseFunction.
13Relevant tools include DSolve, Integrate and Maximize.
14The value of  should not be too large for otherwise it will violate
the assumption of weak risk aversion. In the computation we have ensured
u′1(x) > − 1 .
(a) Varying stochasticity, N .
(b) Varying risk aversion parameter, .
Figure 2: Proﬁt comparison in a RA-SP setting. CDP: contribution-
dependent prize (our mechanism); OCP: optimal constant prize.
Constant Prize: On the other hand, if the prize is a con-
stant M0, Corollary 3 gives the equilibrium strategy z∗ =
s−
n
2
√
n−1
n M0. The proﬁt at equilibrium can thus be derived
from (22) as
Ω∗ = n
∫∞
1
z∗ dF −M0 = 2
√
n(n−1)M0
n+2 −M0,
and the maximum proﬁt can be then obtained using FOC, as
Ω∗max =
n(n−1)
(n+2)2
which is achieved when M0 =
n(n−1)
(n+2)2 (i.e., revenue is the
double of cost).15
Figure 3: Proﬁt comparison under a RN-DP setting, by varying the
deterministic number of agents, n.
Results: We compare these two mechanisms in Fig. 3. The
closed-form expressions permit demonstrating the result over
15In the case of RN-DP with CP, the revenue equivalence theorem applies,
and hence can also be used to solve for the equilibrium strategy and revenue.
However, when using the theorem, note that the revenue collected from each
agent is h(z) and not z, in order to obtain the same result.
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a larger range of n which we vary up to 30. Besides that
CDP outperforms OCP as observed in Fig. 2a, we additionally
see that the proﬁt of CDP exhibits a linearly increasing trend
whereas the proﬁt of OCP exhibits diminishing gain as n
increases. Even more promising is the asymptotic behavior: as
n goes to inﬁnity, Ω∗max approaches 1 whereas Ω˚ maintains the
linear growth with n, which is highly desirable. This is partially
explained by the remark in Section IV-D (and we provide
further explanation in Section VI) where CDP endogenizes n
into the prize function to negate the dampening effect from
which, however, OCP suffers.16
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Intuitively, why would a contribution-dependent prize per-
form better than an optimized constant prize? Philosophically
speaking, the former offers one more degree of freedom for the
principal to maneuver, and thus he should naturally be able to
do better than without. Technically speaking, we have explained
that the principal uses the prize function to endogenize the
number of agents to offset the dampening effect of a larger
population size on agents’ contribution. Another reason is
that the prize function allows the principal to leverage risk-
averse agents’ fear of losing auctions to incentivize agents to
contribute, as demonstrated in Section V-A.
Put in a realistic setting, CDP also has an advantage of
counteracting skewed belief, where (some or all) agents view
other agents to be of higher-type (if the type is cost-alike) or
lower-type (if the type is skill-alike) than their actual types,
or in intuitive terms, agents may underestimate others to be
“weaker” than they actually are. Therefore, if the prize is
constant, an agent has incentive to reserve effort (i.e., make
less contribution) in order to reduce the winning margin since
he can only win the ﬁxed prize regardless of how much he
outdoes the runner-up. In a worse case, the total contribution
(revenue) may not even cover the principal’s ﬁxed cost and thus
result in deﬁcit. In contrast, CDP suppresses this disincentive of
exerting effort by offering extra reward if the winner overdoes;
on the other hand, when contribution turns out to be low, the
cost (prize) automatically shrinks and thereby avoid deﬁcit.
To summarize, this paper provides an incentive mechanism
based on all-pay auctions in participatory-sensing or crowd-
sensing contexts. This mechanism accommodates incomplete
information with information asymmetry, risk-averse agents and
stochastic population. As such, it can apply generally or be
extended to other human-centric networking environments.
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